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In response to the increasingly 
authoritarian government of Hosni Muburak, 
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has emerged as 
the only meaningful opposition party—even 
though the Brotherhood has been illegal for the 
last fifty years.  Despite its often violent and 
murky past, in the last twenty years the 
Brotherhood has preached a platform based on 
moderate and peaceful Islamic activism as well 
as the compatibility of democracy and Islam. 
However, there are still elements of the Muslim 
Brotherhood that suggest certain democratic 
values would be abandoned should the 
Brotherhood achieve power, and some critics 
who contend that the recent changes in the 
Brotherhood are a ploy to achieve political 
power.   
A comparison to the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), an Indian Hindu-nationalist party, 
as well as a vein of democratic theory known as 
moderation theory, are both useful tools to 
address these concerns.  The comparison of the 
BJP to the Muslim Brotherhood demonstrates 
that, in the case of both parties, popular support 
was linked to the party’s status as the only 
viable opposition to the existing political 
regime, not support for a religious platform.  
The popularity of oppositional rhetoric allows 
for cleavages within the party to be temporarily 
masked. Pre-existing political elites who 
controlled the party voiced a religious platform 
that is not representative of the party’s new 
popular support but did not cost the party that 
popular support.  Achieving political power  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
forces the entrenched party elite to confront the 
true nature of its support or risk losing it.  
Moderation theory posits that rational decisions 
by political elites within the party lead the party 
to adopt a more moderate platform in pursuit of 
electoral success, which has already happened 
several times during the recent history of the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  Both analytic tools 
suggest that, if legalized and Egypt’s political 
system democratized, the Brotherhood would 
positively contribute to democratic governance 
in Egypt. 
While the Muslim Brotherhood’s recent 
return to prominence was a product of party 
decisions of the last twenty years, an 
understanding of the origins of the Muslim 
Brotherhood is necessary to understand the 
controversial space the group occupies in the 
Egyptian political and social sphere.  Much of 
the early history of the Muslim Brotherhood is 
unclear but it is known that the organization was 
founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna.  The 
group often participated in anti-Christian 
activism as a method of opposing the British 
occupation of Egypt (Mitchell p. 2).  Soon after 
its formation, the Brotherhood established itself 
as one of the only effective anti-colonial groups, 
earning it a great deal of grassroots public 
support very early in its history (Mitchell p. 9).  
One stated goal of the organization at its 
inception, which continues to this day, is the 
installation of the Sharia as a national body of 
law.  This made the Brotherhood one of the first 
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overtly political Islamic groups established and 
has existed as such continuously since its 
founding, despite many crackdowns by various 
governments.  The relative antiquity and 
persistence of the group has given it a 
perception of historical legitimacy in the eyes of 
many Egyptians.  Furthermore, the role the 
Brotherhood in the establishment of an 
independent Egyptian state earned the group the 
temporary support of the newly established 
government under Gamal Nasser. 
Shortly after the Brotherhood’s 
founding, there were two organizational 
developments that have continued to shape how 
many have viewed the Muslim Brotherhood.  
The first was the involvement of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in social services; by creating a 
social welfare branch, the organization was able 
to receive government funding and avoid 
classification as a religious organization 
(Mitchell p. 37).  This allowed the Brotherhood 
to avoid the state crackdowns against 
“religious” organizations when Arabian identity 
began to be used as a source of legitimacy for 
the secular Egyptian state under Nasser by the 
early 1950s.  The provision of social services 
became especially important following Nasser 
when Sadat, Nasser’s successor, began 
attempting to court US aid in the 1970s.  In an 
effort to bring Egypt in line with norms of the 
capitalist first world, Sadat reduced the heavy 
government spending that Nasser had used to 
provide social services to the Egyptian 
population.  The result was the emergence of a 
faith-based welfare system in which the Muslim 
Brotherhood which used mosques and religious 
organizations to provide and distribute services 
previously provided by the state (Harrigan  p. 
101).  This has increased the Brotherhood’s 
appeal to sectors of the population that might 
not be drawn to the Brotherhood by its religious 
activism (Harringan p. 104).  Since this retreat, 
the government has been unable to reclaim the 
role it previously held under Nasser, as the state 
is often unable to compete with the services 
provided by the Brotherhood (Harrigan 105). 
The second major organizational 
development was the creation of the Secret 
Apparatus, which occurred sometime between 
1930 and 1947 (Mitchell p. 30).  The Secret 
Apparatus was a paramilitary branch of the 
Brotherhood that used violence as a means to 
achieve its goals.  Several factors led to the 
Secret Apparatus having a growing role in the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s early history.  World 
War II provided Banna with an opportunity to 
begin to collect the necessary arms for such a 
group (Mitchell p. 26).  The Muslim 
Brotherhood legitimized their acquisition of 
arms by claiming that the creation of an Israeli 
state at the expense of the existing Palestinian 
community required a group to defend 
Palestinian interests.  Internal schisms within 
the Brotherhood also limited the effectiveness of 
the formal leadership, which led to increased 
emphasis on the more streamlined Secret 
Apparatus (Mitchell p. 55). However, the formal 
leadership of the Brotherhood did have firm 
control over the actions of the Secret Apparatus.  
The assassination of a judge, which Banna did 
not approve of, led him realize this (Mitchell p. 
78).  The relationship of the formal leadership 
and the Secret Apparatus is not clear, since the 
Secret Apparatus was, by nature, secretive.  It 
existence was well-hidden from Egyptian and 
British authorities for a period of time and was 
only discovered by chance when the leader of 
the Secret Apparatus was arrested by authorities 
in 1948 with a briefcase containing details about 
the members and its operations.  Much of the 
uncertainly surrounding the Brotherhood is a 
product of the lack of concrete knowledge of the 
role of the Secret Apparatus in the organization 
and how vital it was believed to be by the 
formal leadership. 
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This uncertainly regarding the role of the 
Secret Apparatus in the Brotherhood has created 
some competing interpretations of how the 
history of the Brotherhood has affected the 
organization.  Some scholars see the provision 
of social services as the defining element of the 
Brotherhood’s foundation, while others believe 
the creation of the Secret Apparatus defined the 
existence and legacy of the Brotherhood.  Juan 
Cole believes in the former’s importance, that 
the Brotherhood was created as a moderate 
organization dedicated to providing social 
services (Cole 51).  Although Cole does 
acknowledge the radicalization inherent in the 
creation of the Secret Apparatus, he believes the 
radicalization to have been temporary and 
caused by the consequences of British imperial 
policy, specifically the creation of Israel (Cole 
p. 52, 55).  Cole sees the Brotherhood’s 
commitment to private property (the group 
opposed land reform in Egypt) as evidence that 
the group wanted to establish a moderate 
government, distinct from the dictatorial models 
present in European fascism (Cole p. 44-45).  
Ultimately, it was Nasser’s popularity that 
prevented the group from ever assuming power 
after independence, although the lingering 
popularity of the Brotherhood eventually led 
Nasser to crack down on the group in the 
interest of preserving his own political power 
(Cole p. 56-7). 
Many other people and organizations, 
most notably the Egyptian government, focus on 
the militant elements of the Brotherhood’s past.  
In conjunction with the creation of the Secret 
Apparatus, subscribers to this view on the 
Brotherhood often focus on the ideologue Sayid 
Qutb, who Cole regards as a fringe member of 
the movement (Cole p. 64-65).  Initially Qutb 
did not join the Brotherhood due to an 
intellectual rivalry with Banna, and eventually 
he fled Egypt for America in the midst of a 
British crackdown on Islamic activism (Wright 
p. 23-4).  While in America, Qutb came to view 
the west as a spiritual wasteland, mainly due to 
its separation of church and state.  This stay in 
the United States radicalized him and became an 
early influence on his religious philosophy.  
After returning to Egypt following Banna’s 
assassination in 1949, Qutb was soon 
imprisoned for anti-government activism.  
While in prison, Qutb released his manifesto, 
Milestones.  In this work, Qutb divided the 
world into “us (people and government who 
practiced an extremely strict adherence to 
Islamic law) versus them (everyone else 
including Muslims) (Haddad p. 79-86) and, in 
this sense, some view Qutb’s work as the 
ideological underpinning of many acts of 
Islamic extremism, including the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks (Wright). 
Other scholars, such as Lawrence 
Wright, believe Qutb had a more active role 
within the organization.  While Wright does not 
make any judgment on the democratic viability 
of the Muslim Brotherhood due to the limited 
timeframe of the Brotherhood covered in his 
book, his narrative of Qutb’s later years show 
his belief that Qutb had a significant role within 
the organization.  During his time in prison, 
Qutb reopened lines of communication among 
the imprisoned Brothers (Zollner p. 26-7).  
Despite being radical, Qutb’s philosophy was a 
rebellion against Nasser’s secular regime and 
offered a criticism more relevant to the situation 
of an Islamic leader who ruled a repressive 
secular state.  While how seriously the 
organization took this view is debatable, Qutb’s 
analysis represented a shift in focus from a 
nationalist struggle to a revolutionary struggle.  
Qutb’s eventual execution by the state led some 
to see him as a martyr (Wright p. 31).  These 
events had the effect of reinvigorating the 
Brotherhood and helping it dampen the 
effectiveness of subsequent crackdowns.  People 
who still believe the Brotherhood to be radical 
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often point to Qutb’s work and role in the 
organization as the defining element of the 
Brotherhood.  Most importantly, these two 
interpretations of the Brotherhood demonstrate 
that there is a lot of room for interpretation 
when rendering a judgment about the group 
based solely on its origins.  However, recent 
development suggest that the “moderate” 
Muslim Brotherhood offers a more accurate way 
of understanding the group’s past in relation to 
the present. 
The next major relevant organizational 
development was the moderation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, demonstrated by its participation 
in the 1984 parliamentary elections.  At the 
time, the Brotherhood was (and remains) illegal.  
However, participation in elections 
demonstrated a willingness to interact with the 
state through open, official and legal channels, a 
major turn for the Brotherhood whose 
legitimacy has been historically based in the 
informal sector.  The “new” Brotherhood first 
participated in the 1984 parliamentary elections 
and, in the 1987 elections, adopted its signature 
slogan of “Islam is the solution” (Mecham p. 
190).  The group ran on a platform of the 
compatibility of its Islamic platform with a 
democratic system of governance.  A 2010 
statement by the Brotherhood demonstrates that 
its stated stance was that the organization 
priority was not “Implementing Islamic law, 
however, in moderation but becoming a party 
and promoting Islamic values in a democratic 
system” (Mayton 2010b).  In fact, elections 
became the Brotherhood’s main method of 
engaging the Mubarak government after 1984 
(Mecham p. 191).  In order to engage the 
government, the Brotherhood has not isolated 
itself to working solely with Islamic activism 
but has worked with a wide array of other 
political actors, including secular socialist and 
liberal parties (Mecham p. 190-191).  These 
actions demonstrate the main priority of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, that inspiring meaningful 
political reform through pragmatic means is a 
major goal of the party. 
After this initial foray into politics, the 
Brotherhood began to clarify the political 
positions it stood for.  Although many of its 
platforms remain murky to this day, mainly due 
to its illegality, in 1991 the Brotherhood and 
other opposition groups committed themselves 
to a ten-point political platform that included 
many of the characteristics associated with a 
western democracy, such as free formation of 
political parties, direct election of the president, 
independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and 
allowing non-Muslims to follow their own 
religious laws (Mecham p. 192).  This 
demonstrates that the Muslim Brotherhood was 
no longer solely representative of those pushing 
for an Islamic government, but that it also 
represented a democratic alternative to 
Mubarak’s continued move toward 
authoritarianism.  Furthermore, this call for 
democratic norms represented a clear borrowing 
from the western concept of democracy 
(Mecham p. 194), a radical departure from 
Qutb’s belief that the western model of 
statehood was alien to Islam.   
Another key element of the Brotherhood 
was establishing control over the professional 
syndicates in Egypt.  This has allowed the 
Brotherhood to expand its appeal by providing 
an avenue to address employed Egyptians.  The 
syndicates also serve as means for the 
distribution of the public services offered by the 
Brotherhood, as well a source of professionals 
that aid in the provision of these social services.  
The role played by the Brotherhood in the 
professional syndicates has also proven the 
Brotherhood’s leadership to be competent and 
honest administrators, adding to their reputation 
as a potentially effective alternative to the status 
quo (Demmelhuber p. 125). 
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This new call for democracy resulted in 
a surge of grassroots popular support from the 
Bortherhood (Mecham p.193).  However, this 
support has led to a corresponding crackdown 
by the Mubarak government.  During this 
crackdown, there was a revival of references to 
Qutb by the government in an attempt to 
ostracize the Brotherhood from mainstream 
Egyptian government.  In particular, one recent 
march of masked students was highlighted as 
reminiscent of the Secret Apparatus.  This 
association of the Brotherhood with its murky, 
and often radical, past is the rhetorical 
centerpiece of the government’s efforts to curb 
the enthusiasm of the Brotherhood.  
Government arrests have often targeted 
moderates within the partly, limiting their 
influence. 
Despite these crackdowns, the 
Brotherhood had a surprisingly successful 
electoral performance in 2005.  Despite running 
as independents, candidates associated with the 
group won 88 (20%) seats and became the 
largest opposition to Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party (NDP).  This again 
demonstrated that the Brotherhood had become 
a credible and popular political alternative to 
Mubarak’s government (Mecham p. 193).  
During the campaign, the group advocated an 
inclusive national citizenship, not tied to 
religion, as some had believed might occur 
(Mecham p. 199).  Two of the elected 
parliament members were female, although 
concerns have not faded that, if in power, the 
Muslim Brotherhood would practice some 
forms of gender discrimination (Mecham p. 
200).   The group emerged from the elections 
with a new level of popular legitimacy in the 
eyes of the Egyptian population and a level of 
credibility in the eyes of international actors 
(Mecham p. 194). 
This increased role in the public sphere, 
however, did not usher in a new era of stability 
within the organization.  If anything, the group 
now finds itself on the most unsure footing since 
its in entry into politics, partially due to its 
electoral success.  2007 was a particularly 
tumultuous year: in response to the success of 
the Brotherhood at the polls, the government 
passed a series of constitutional amendments 
that outlawed any form of political activism 
based on religion (Amnesty International 
3/18/2007).  This basically eliminated any 
likelihood that the government would legalize 
the Brotherhood in the near future.  This recent 
round of repression has had serious effects on 
the group.  Some believe that it stifled the 
group’s attempt at mimicking its sister 
movements in other countries such as separating 
the political party from the rest of the 
organization. This would make the political 
branch of the Brotherhood, which is generally 
moderate, independent from the broader 
social/religious movement, controlled by a 
generally conservative party hierarchy. This 
separation has led to a moderation of the 
political platforms among the Egyptian 
Brotherhood’s regional sister movements 
(Brown 2008 p. 12, 18).   
The government’s repressive policies 
can be seen as an effort to validate its 
radicalism-based view of the Brotherhood.  By 
outlawing religious-based political activism, the 
government is forcing the Brotherhood to 
confront a new political reality that the 
Brotherhood’s democratic policies will not 
allow them to rise to the head of government, 
offering incentives for the Brotherhood to 
retreat from its democratic platforms.    The 
repression has prevented the separation of the 
party from the broader religious movement, 
which would likely have a moderating effect on 
the political branch and make the party 
consistent with the constitutional amendments.  
These amendments mean that the government 
can punish the group for acting through official 
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channels.  However, if the group attempts to act 
through unofficial channels, the government 
will interpret this as a formal return to the days 
of the Secret Apparatus, validating government 
critiques of the Muslim Brotherhood as well as 
repressive state policies.   
By behaving in an authoritarian manner 
and changing the constitution based on political 
convenience, the Egyptian government is 
encouraging a democratic backslide of the 
Brotherhood in other ways. Political actors are 
unlikely to behave in ways that cannot be 
justified by the institutional or cultural norms of 
a society (Tezcur p. 73).   The Egyptian 
government is eliminating the democratic norms 
that would restrain political actors from acting 
through unofficial and undemocratic means. An 
important implication of the government’s 
policies against the Brotherhood is that the 
government views the Brotherhood as a threat 
mainly to political power, not as a terrorist 
organization.  By attempting to demonstrate that 
the Brotherhood has maintained its connections 
to extremist interpretations of Islam, the 
government would alienate the Brotherhood 
from the majority of the Egyptian population 
and minimize its political influence. 
In 2007, the Brotherhood circulated a 
draft party platform among intellectuals in 
Egypt, which was subsequently leaked to the 
press (Brown 2008 p.1).  This was the most 
detailed platform issued by the group to date 
and was an effort to address some of the 
criticism the group received for its often vague 
statements in opposition to the current 
government.  While the greatest 
accomplishment of the platform may be that the 
vast majority of the it did not raise any major 
controversies, the platform not only raised some 
question in regard to the internal coherence of 
the group but also detailed several policies that 
would be antithetical to a democratic 
government (Brown 2008 p. 5).  However, the 
main focus of the platform remained grounded 
in social and economic issues, not religious 
issues (Brown 2008 p. 5) 
Two small portions of the platform 
raised major concern.  The first was a provision 
against allowing women and non-Muslims to 
serve as president of the state, reasoning that 
only a Muslim male can lead a Muslim state.  
This renewed fears that a government under the 
Muslim Brotherhood might result in a step 
backwards for the rights of women and religious 
minorities.  Though this platform was only a 
draft, the inclusion of this position into the draft 
sparked a heated debate within the organization 
about whether such exclusions is consistent with 
Sharia law (Brown 2008 p. 5).   
The other major controversy in the draft 
was the creation of an extra-constitutional body 
of religious scholars to ensure that all legislation 
is consistent with Article II of the Egyptian 
Constitution, which dictates that all law must be 
in accordance with the Sharia (Brown 2008 p. 
4).  This was troubling for a number of reasons. 
First, it was a departure from the transparent and 
democratic nature of previous Brotherhood 
positions.  Furthermore, it represented a major 
philosophical shift from allowing individuals to 
interpret religious law for themselves and 
toward the potential of having a state-imposed 
religious orthodoxy forced upon the population.  
The language of the passage was not clear, 
although it did suggest that this body of scholars 
might have final say in several legislative 
realms.  Leadership within the organization has 
suggested that if a final draft would ever be 
produced, this portion would be omitted (Brown 
2010 p. 11) 
In response to the crackdown from the 
government and the blowback from the leaking 
of the draft, the Brotherhood has begun a slow 
retreat from the public sphere under new 
leadership.  The recently appointed leader the 
organization, Muhammad Badi, has a reputation 
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for engagement through the religious movement 
more than the political movement (Brown 
2010b).  Despite Amnesty International’s call 
for the government crackdown against the 
Muslim Brotherhood to end, the government has 
recently escalated its crackdown by targeting 
high-ranking officers of the Brotherhood, a 
departure from its previous crackdowns 
(Mayton 2010a). In this context, the 
Brotherhood’s retreat does not bode well for 
opposition to Mubarak in Egypt.  It is widely 
expected that Hosni Mubarak will have his son, 
Gamel, succeed him following the end of his 
term (Demmelhuber p. 119).  Some analysis 
suggests that, besides making a mockery of the 
democratic rhetoric of the current government, 
it will also benefit a converging class of 
business and political elites, who will likely 
profit from Gamel Mubarak’s technocratic 
inclinations (Demmelhuber p. 119).  The 
creation of a “Mubarak dynasty” in Egypt 
would represent the continuing erosion of 
democratic governance within the country. 
The enormous role played by the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian opposition 
enhances the importance of any contribution to 
democratic goverance.  The two major 
controversies in the 2007 platform represent a 
democratic backslide from previous positions.  
Moderation theory, developed by Robert 
Michels in a study of European radical socialist 
parties, can be useful when addressing whether 
these positions would serve as a serious barrier 
to democracy in Egypt.  Although socialism and 
Islam are certainly not identical, the holistic 
nature of the socialist philosophy has certain 
parallels with the increased role of Islam 
(represented by the Ulama Council) in the 2007 
party platform.  Also, like the Brotherhood, the 
socialist parties studied by Michels were 
initially outside of electoral politics. 
Guines Tezcur specifically relates 
moderation theory to Islamic opposition 
movements in Iran and Turkey, finding that a 
moderation two of Islamic parties in both states 
did indeed occur (Tezcur p. 83).  Tezcur 
describes the Islamic parties he focuses on as 
often having weak democratic credentials in the 
face of authoritarian regimes, which can 
certainly be applied to the Muslim Brotherhood 
(Tezcur p. 71).  He also believes that the process 
of Islamic-based opposition appears to be a 
natural and organic process, noting that it 
occurrs in the context of both a theocratic 
government and a relatively secular democracy 
(Tezcur p. 74).  The Islamic opposition 
movements, according to Tezcur, were a 
“product of soul searching among younger 
Islamicists” that led to an abandonment of 
“utopian goals in favor of pragmatic, pluralistic 
and moderation discourse” (Tezcur p. 74).  The 
re-entry of the Brotherhood into electoral 
politics and the role of the younger moderate 
faction within the group fit the Brotherhood into 
Tezcur’s analysis of Islamic opposition 
movements. 
One major assumption Michels based his 
study on is that political parties are controlled 
by elites, who could (and often did) make 
decisions without input from the party as a 
whole (Michels, quoted in Tezcur p. 71).  A 
later discussion on the internal structure of the 
Brotherhood shows that the organization does 
indeed have a strong centralized hierarchy that 
has control over the party apparatus, meaning 
that Michel’s assumption does not preclude the 
Brotherhood from his theory.  Michels believes 
that the pursuit of votes and the organizational 
structure cause the moderation of political 
parties within a democracy because elites within 
the party make rational decisions to shift 
policies to the center in the pursuit of electoral 
votes or risk electoral failure (Michels, quoted 
in Tezcur 71).  In fact, the use of an Islamic 
identity may simply be an instrumental choice 
by the party to appeal to a broadly defined 
7
Morrissey: The Democratic Viability of Islamic Opposition in Egypt
Published by KnightScholar, 2011
67 
 
identity, as was the case with some Islamic 
activism in Turkey (Tezcur p. 80).  Literature on 
the radical socialist parties indicates that their 
involvement in parliamentary politics has 
brought about moderation (Tezcur p. 73). 
Moderation theory can be applied to the 
Muslim Brotherhood.  First, it should be noted 
that the recent post-1984 moderation process 
can be seen as consistent with moderation 
theory.  The decision was made by elites within 
the organization, since there was no external 
electoral accountability prior to entry in the 
1984 elections.  Entry into electoral politics, 
with the Brotherhood’s current respect for 
existing political institutions, is a clear 
moderation from the philosophy of some of its 
earlier ideologues, especially that of Qutb.  One 
key element of the moderation process is the 
abandonment of exclusivist rhetoric (Michels, 
quoted in Tezcur pp. 71-2).  This would be good 
news for the Coptic Christian minority and 
women, in regard to a more open field for 
candidate selection.  Indeed, Abdul Moneim 
Aboul, a jailed moderate leader of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, seems to confirm this possibility, 
saying that the provisions against Copts and 
women serving as president are not final 
(Mayton 2010a).  Also, in describing loyalty to 
a socialist identity, Michels comments that 
beliefs do not directly lead to decisions by 
actors but rather political actors are predisposed 
to certain beliefs because of their ideology 
(Michels, quoted in Tezcur p. 73).  The 
Brotherhood’s Islamic identity would not 
prevent a repeal of the position against non-
Muslims.  Previous ideological shifts have 
demonstrated that the Brotherhood’s Islamic 
identity has not been a serious barrier to other 
democratic party platforms.  
As such changes take place within the 
party, “party organization acquires a life of its 
own at the expense of revolutionary principles” 
(Michels, quoted in Tezcur p. 71).  However, 
there needs to exist popular sentiment to 
continue to drive the Brotherhood away from 
positions antithetical to democratic goverance.  
World Public Opinion polls demonstrate that 
this would be the case: a 2008 poll showed that 
98% of Egyptians agree that the will of the 
people should be the basis of the authority of the 
government (emphasis added, WPO 2008).  
Ninety-seven percent believes that the will of 
the people should have a greater influence in the 
government than it already does (WPO 2008).  
Other polls conducted by World Public Opinion 
show that 75% of the Egyptian population 
believes it is important that a country is 
governed democratically and 67% believes it is 
important to be able to express unpopular views 
(WPO 2009).  These polls demonstrate that the 
Egyptian population will continue to enable 
party leaders to make rational decisions toward 
an increasingly moderate platform.  Recent 
development seems to confirm this, as it is 
expected the Brotherhood will defer to existing 
political institutions instead of creating new 
ones in any subsequent platforms (Brown 2008 
p. 16). 
Another crucial causal factor of 
moderation is the party’s lack of resources.  
Once an electoral strategy has been established, 
it is often not possible for the party to pursue an 
alternative strategy (Tezcur p. 76).  Changes 
made by the elite, out of calculated self-interest, 
become the genuine direction of the party.  
However, the actions of the state can change or 
prevent this moderation.  The greater the threat 
from state oppression, “the more cautious and 
risk adverse reformers are” (Tezcur p. 75).  By 
threatening the group with repression, decision 
makers within the party will avoid using open 
and official channels to accomplish their goal.  
Repression affects the rational decision of the 
elite within the party because it alters the cost-
benefit analysis that elites make in their decision 
to potentially moderate the party.  Ultimately, 
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repression increases the cost of operating in an 
official and transparent manner, disincentivizing 
their use. 
Socialist and other Islamic parties are 
not the only relevant examples when discussing 
the democratic viability of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 
in India provides another extremely useful 
comparison.  The BJP is a Hindu-nationalist 
party that rose to prominence in the late 1980s 
and played an increasingly large role in Indian 
politics, culminating in the creation of its own 
government from 1999 to 2004.  As the party 
came to power, its Hindu nationalist stance 
(which was its defining attribute into the early 
1990s) morphed into a more centrist political 
ideology.  This change was a consequence of 
the democratic structure of the Indian 
government and the popularity of oppositional 
rhetoric to the existing political order, in the 
case of the BJP, the Congress Party.   
In the case of the BJP, the popularity of 
oppositional rhetoric increased support for the 
party but masked internal cleavages within the 
party and its voters.  During this time in which 
cleavages are less important, the internal 
structure of the party empowers an inherited 
conservative party elite, allowing them to 
control the rhetoric of the party.  The result is 
that certain elements of the party’s rhetoric are 
not representative of the party’s popular 
support, but those who disagree with the parts of 
these parts of the party line stay with the party 
because it offers the best chance to change the 
political status quo.  Once the party achieves a 
significant degree of popularity in an open 
political setting, these cleavages become salient 
and the party must realistically address its 
support or risk losing it.  It is important to 
recognize that a party having a religious 
platform does not make it impossible to attract 
the support of those not interested in its 
religious message.  The BJP, similar to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, had significant economic 
and social reform platforms, tapping into the 
large segments of the population who felt 
disenpowered or ignored by the Congress or 
Mubarak governments. 
India had initially formed a state based 
on secular nationalism, although Jawaharlal 
Nehru, India’s first prime minister, adopted a 
narrow form of state-sponsored secularism 
(Jugersmeyer p. 107).  Key to this secular 
nationalism was the protection of religious 
minority rights, especially the rights of 
Muslims.  The BJP made the claim that this was 
actually preferential treatment of Muslims, who 
did not deserve a role in what the BJP believed 
was India’s Hindu civilization.  Calling this 
protection of religious rights “pseudo-
secularism,” the BJP wanted the state to 
formally adopt an exclusively Hindu culture as a 
means to reclaim its previous cultural glory.  
This was an exclusivist ideology, which defined 
religious minorities as foreign to Indian culture. 
Following India’s independence, the 
state was essentially a one-party democracy, 
with the Congress party receiving the dominant 
share of the votes.  Despite being basically 
unchallenged until the rise of the BJP, the 
Indian state remained a democracy.  However, 
the Congress Party began to change as a second 
generation of political leaders, those not directly 
involved in national independence movement, 
began to assume leadership within the party.  
This new generation was more concerned with 
the political end of the Congress Party, which 
originally had a strong network of social 
institutions as well as a party apparatus 
(Varshney 2002 p. 241).  This weakened loyalty 
to the Congress Party among its traditional 
support groups.  The declining state of the 
Congress Party, which had been the bastion of 
secular nationalism in the Indian state, created 
the space that allowed communal political 
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developments, on which the BJP attempted to 
capitalize (Varshney 2002 p. 242-3). 
It was within this context that the 
destruction of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya 
took place.  The mosque was built on the site of 
the alleged birthplace of the Hindu deity Rama 
and became a focal point of the Hindu 
nationalist movement in the early 1990s.  After 
a series of demonstrations and unclear 
government positions, the mosque was 
destroyed, setting off a round of communal 
violence.  Two organizations, the RSS and 
VHP, both linked to the BJP, were believed to 
have had a major role in stirring up the 
communal tension that led to the riots 
(Juergensmeyer p. 111).  The BJP attempted to 
capitalize on the renewed salience of a 
politicized Hindu identity in electoral politics, 
going as far as releasing its own White Paper on 
the destruction of the mosque to present an 
alternative explanation and increasing the Hindu 
nationalist rhetoric.  However, the BJP did not 
see an increase in its vote share following the 
destruction of the mosque and was generally 
humiliated at the elections (Hasan p. 15), an 
early indication that the success of the BJP was 
not only the product of Hindu nationalism. 
This public failure forced the BJP to 
“harmonize its ideas with thirst for power” 
(Hasan p. 15).  While maintaining a Hindu 
nationalist rhetoric, the BJP changed a number 
of its policies.  It offered some policies that are 
friendly to Muslims under the guise of 
economic policies (Basu 1996 p. 61-2).  Other 
economic policies have generally been viewed 
as liberal, especially catering to a rising middle 
class coming from the information technology 
sector, a reversal from its previous nationalist 
economic position (Hasan p. 18, Jugersmeyer p. 
114).  The BJP has made an effort to appeal to 
different groups, both at the federal and state 
level.  It reversed its policy of not making 
coalitions in order to expand its power; in fact, 
religion is no longer a major element in BJP 
coalition building (Hasan p 18, 16, Basu 2000 p. 
399).  A the state level, the BJP has made a 
greater effort to appeal to a diverse body of 
voters, going so far as to alter its message to 
appeal to different groups (Basu 1996 p.68).  
The closer the BJP has come to exercising 
national power, the more moderate is has 
become (Basu 2000 p. 384) 
One major causal factor of the 
moderation of the BJP is what Ashutosh 
Varshney calls “the self-correcting mechanisms 
of Indian democracy” (Varshney 1995 p. 38).  
Varshney argues that the independence and 
unpredictability of government institutions, the 
realities of identity politics in India, and certain 
voting patterns punish parties for extremist 
rhetoric and violations of democratic norms.  
Institutional unpredictability, diversity, and 
independence have prevented a single party 
from monopolizing control of government 
institutions by preventing parties in power from 
being able to change the norms away from 
democratic governance (Varshney 1995 p. 40).  
When parties have challenged the governmental 
institutions, they have been rebuked, ensuring 
compliance with the existing democratic norms.  
Varshney points out that the judiciary branch 
decided that religious beliefs cannot overtake 
secular issues (Varshney 1995 p. 40).  The BJP 
bumped up against these institutional barriers as 
it rose to political prominence and was forced to 
bring its policies in line with the democratic 
norms of Indian governance. 
The role of identity politics in Indian 
democracy is twofold.  First, the wide variety of 
cleavages in India means that a party cannot just 
appeal to a single cleavage group and expect to 
make serious political gains (Varshney 1995 p. 
41).  This reality forced the BJP to appeal to 
different groups and moderate its positions in 
doing so.  The second role played by identity 
was that the continuing use of Hindu identity by 
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the BJP in political matters had diluted the 
meaning of the term (Varshney 1995 p. 39).  As 
more and more people joined the BJP, its 
definition of what was truly a “Hindu” had to 
change to accommodate its new members.  The 
result was that the term became watered down 
and what it meant to be a Hindu in the BJP in 
1989 was radically different than what it meant 
to be a Hindu in the BJP in 1999.  This dilution 
of the conceptions of Hindu identity led several 
of the more extreme Hindu nationalists to leave 
the BJP and form their own parties.  By 
expanding its popular base, the BJP destroyed 
the cohesiveness of the very identity it was 
trying to preserve.  The Hindu identity the BJP 
was trying to support became less exclusivist 
and identity politics based on this “Hindu” 
identity now had to accommodate a diverse 
body of support or risk losing support.   
Politicization of “Hindu” identity with 
such a communal purpose also fueled “strategic 
voting,” meaning that people opposed to the 
BJP voted for the party they believed would 
have the best chance of defeating the BJP 
(Varshney 1995 p. 40).  In effect, even though 
the BJP increased its vote share, it did not 
automatically gain political power because the 
BJP unified its opposition through its use of 
Hindu nationalism.  The democratic process of 
the Indian government meant that creating an 
“in group” as the basis of a political party meant 
creating a unified opposition of the “out group.” 
Similar developments within the 
Egyptian political system and the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s own platform suggest that the 
“self-correcting mechanisms” Varshney pointed 
out exist, or would exist if the Brotherhood 
achieved power, in the Egyptian political 
system.  Despite the democratic backslide, the 
judiciary branch of Egypt has remained largely 
independent of the executive branch (which also 
controls the legislative), and has remained the 
target of Mubarak’s attempt to expand his 
power (Phillips p. 21-2).  In its initial ten-point 
opposition plan, the Brotherhood committed 
itself to maintaining the independence of the 
judiciary branch as well as creating a more 
empowered legislative branch through the 
creation of a parliamentary system (Mecham p. 
192).  The likely retraction of the creation of an 
extra-constitutional religious panel would 
signify a rededication to this liberal position.  
These institutions would check some of the less 
democratic positions of the Brotherhood. 
The use of an “Islamic” identity is also 
creating a similar dilution of the politically 
constructed identity, as well as strategic 
opposition.  Much like some groups that 
opposed the BJP in India, the Christian Coptic 
minority has openly advocated that people vote 
along an anti-Muslim Brotherhood line (Salam 
2010).  Given the significant percentage of the 
Copts in the Egyptian population, such 
mobilization against a specific group would 
likely have stifling legislative implications if the 
Brotherhood should be legalized and participate 
in parliamentary politics with anti-Coptic 
positions.  A later discussion of cleavages 
within the Muslim Brotherhood will also 
demonstrate a dilution of a politicized Islamic 
identity.  As the group has expanded, it has 
deviated from its norm of having a unitary party 
voice because an increasingly diverse group of 
people is being brought under the Islamic 
identity of the Brotherhood.   
There are other reasons that suggest a 
moderation of the Brotherhood would take place 
if it were to be integrated into a democratic 
system because, like the BJP, the religious 
rhetoric of the party is not the cause of, or 
representative of, the popular support of the 
party.  To understand how the religious rhetoric 
of a party might not be representative of its 
mass following, it is necessary to understand the 
structure of each party.  In the case of the BJP, 
the party is directly linked to the Rashtriya 
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Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a volunteer 
organization that advocates an extreme form of 
Hindu nationalism.  The RSS was founded in 
1925 by middle-class Hindu nationalists to train 
young men to resist the appeal of a secular 
society (Juergensmeyer p 106).  The philosophy 
of the group makes numerous references to a 
great Hindu past and a desire to restore that past 
by creating a Hindu nation (Juergensmeyer p. 
107).  The RSS supplied not only the early party 
cadres, but also the energy and dedication to get 
the BJP off the ground (Juergensmeyer 2008 p. 
107, Basu 1996 p.64). 
With this early control, the RSS turned 
the BJP into a centralized party, with much of 
the control lying with the party elite provided to 
the BJP by the RSS (Basu 1996 p. 60).  It also 
created a situation of dependency, in which the 
BJP could not break ties with the RSS (Hasan p. 
19).  From its inception to its rise to 
prominence, the RSS had a firm grip on the 
internal mechanisms of the party.  As the BJP 
expanded its support, this internal control would 
not change to reflect new, more inclusive 
realities of the party’ support.  Essentially, the 
people who came to support the BJP for 
oppositional reasons inherited a party apparatus 
that had its roots firmly in Hindu nationalism. 
During expansion, the BJP began to 
move away from its traditional sources of upper 
caste Hindu nationalists support.  Oliver Hearth 
tracks the expansion of the BJP’s electoral base, 
noting that when it first began to rise to 
prominence in 1989, the BJP was mainly a 
regional phenomenon, not a nationwide 
movement (Hearth p. 232).  The party expanded 
its support by courting voters in regions 
adjacent to pre-existing supportive regions, not 
through a simultaneous expansion of support 
(Hearth p. 233).  The regional spread of political 
support did have a direct role in the moderation 
of the BJP.  It forced the BJP to abandon some 
of its religious platforms tied to regionalism, 
most notably its desire to change the national 
language to a northern dialect of Hindi and 
exclude Urdu as an official language.  However, 
as the BJP began to expand, it had to create a 
more nationally appealing language position and 
abandon its desire to change the national 
language.  As the BJP began to expand its 
influence to other regions, it was forced to 
concede this platform to attract voters from 
other regions (Basu 2000 p. 386).  
As it expanded, the BJP moved away 
from its traditional support by increasingly 
courting, a voter bloc know as Other Backward 
Castes (OBCs) (Hearth p. 256).  In fact, the 
OBC made up a group of the fastest-rising party 
personnel in the mid-1990s (Varshney 1995 p. 
40).   Eventually, the support from non-
traditional locations was greater than support 
from traditional locations (Hearth p. 256).  The 
BJP was filling the space left by Congress as its 
second and latter generations of political leaders 
retreated from the social sphere.  This validates 
Amrita Basu’s assertion that the “BJP has given 
voices to sources of frustration and aggression 
that have little to do with religious faith” (Basu 
1996 p. 58).  The inability of increased religious 
rhetoric to attract more voters also suggests that 
the electoral success was not related to religious 
platforms, but accompanying platforms.  The 
BJP was able to voice political grievances 
against the Congress system and capitalize on 
dissatisfaction with the political status quo 
(Hasan p. 15, Basu 1996 p. 64).   During its rise 
to power, the BJP was able to consistently win 
the “anti-establishment” vote (Basu 2000 p. 
385). 
Thus, this new source of BJP support, 
which made up the majority of the support, 
came mainly from non-traditional voters who 
saw the BJP as a political movement against the 
Congress Party, not as an attempt to revitalize 
India as a purely “Hindu” civilization.  Since the 
BJP represented the major viable opposition to 
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the Congress Party, the religious rhetoric 
preached by the inherited party elites in control 
of the party apparatus did not drive away the 
more politically oriented recent supporters of 
the BJP.  However, once the BJP came to 
power, the divide between the traditional 
support and the more moderate recent 
supporters became salient.  The BJP could not 
alienate these voters or else it would lose power 
and with it any chance the elites had at passing a 
religious agenda.  The result was that, in 
accordance with moderation theory, RSS 
leadership consented to the moderation in 
exchange for political power (Hasan p. 15). 
A similar occurrence is taking place 
within the Muslim Brotherhood.  The cleavage 
between the conservatives and moderates is 
becoming increasingly salient, and would have a 
moderating effect should the Brotherhood 
participate in elections with the goals of 
winning them.  The moderates, or reformers, 
draw their leadership from the professional 
syndicates and its support from the student 
movements and professional syndicates (Al-
Ahram no. 970).  As a whole, the group favors a 
greater emphasis on the electoral aspect of the 
movement, a separation of the party from the 
movement, and more internal democracy within 
the party.   Many reformers have voiced a 
preference for a Turkish-style democracy 
(Mayton 2010b).  The group also favors an 
active role for the group in Egyptian society 
(Madbouli 2010). Although the moderates tend 
to be younger than the conservatives, their 
leaders have still been in the movement since 
the 1970s (Al-Alhram no. 970).  The reformers 
tend to have a more grassroots nature to their 
support and activism, having especially 
embraced the internet, party because the 
conservatives have a much stronger grip on the 
official channels of the partly (Al-Ahram no 
970, Ursala 2009).   
Key to understanding the conservative 
faction within the party is the fact that the 
faction does not automatically support religion 
over democracy (Madbouli 2010).  The group 
does indeed want to put a greater emphasis on 
strengthening the ideological outreach of the 
group (Madbouli 2010).  However, there is also 
a strong organizational component, with the 
conservatives favoring pre-existing and 
expedient organizational structure, even though 
they do not always favor internal democracy 
(Rashwan).  This is not just a way of preserving 
their own power within the party, but also seen 
as a way of protecting the party itself.  Leaders 
of the conservative faction moved through the 
ranks of the Brotherhood in the 1950s, in the 
context of the crackdowns by the British and 
eventually Nasser (Ursala).  The fact that the 
quick, and somewhat secretive, organizational 
structure has helped and continues to help the 
Brotherhood survive new crackdowns by the 
government is recognized by the conservatives 
within the party. 
The divide between the moderates and 
conservatives is becoming increasingly more 
apparent.  In response to the 2007 platform, 
visible differences began to emerge between the 
two camps (Brown 2008 p. 6).  Many reformers 
claimed the draft was not circulated among all 
party members and, thus, was not a product of 
the entire organization (Brown 2008 pp. 7-8).  
More recently, the election of a new Supreme 
Guide of the Brotherhood revealed the split 
between the two groups (Al-Ahram nos. 969, 
983).  While a compromise was used to select a 
new leader, many still felt it left out many of the 
moderates, who are disenfranchised by the 
current party structure (Rashwan).  The result 
was that Mohammed Baidi, a conservative with 
a history in the ideological outreach of the 
Brotherhood, was chosen as the next (and 
current) Supreme Guide (Brown 2010, Al 
Ahram no. 983). 
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The internal structure of the Brotherhood 
empowers the conservative faction, mainly 
through seniority.  While this does reward 
loyalty to the movement and promote the 
survival of the organization, it also means that 
the leadership of the Brotherhood has not 
changed to reflect its massive increase in 
popularity following the entry into politics, 
similar to the BJP.  The Guidance or Shura 
Council, which formulates group policy and 
elects the Supreme Guide (head executive), is 
unelected (Phillips p. 12; Rashwan).  The result 
is that this council is now controlled by the first-
generation conservative faction and the party 
apparatus represent the ideological values of the 
conservatives, partly as a tactic to maintain its 
unique status among the Egyptian opposition 
groups (Brown 2008 p. 17).  Unlike the BJP 
elite prior to electoral success, the elite within 
the Brotherhood have presented a more 
moderate stance.  They have offered a 
progressive combination of democracy and 
Islam that looks toward the future as a source of 
inspiration, unlike the primordial view of Indian 
civilization initially offered by the BJP.  While 
it is not always clear whether the Brotherhood’s 
leadership sees Islam or democracy as its first 
priority, it is important to remember that the 
voice of the party is not always representative of 
the popular support, and those who control the 
voice of the party have a history of moderating 
their stances.   
The change in popular support of the 
Brotherhood is a product of recent events, 
especially the offering of a democratic 
alternative to the current government and an 
increased role of the Brotherhood in the public 
sphere, while the leadership is a product of 
seniority.  The makeup of party support has 
dramatically changed without corresponding 
changes in the party leadership.  Like the BJP, 
the Brotherhood offers an alternative to the 
status quo that appeals to the self-interest of the 
voters.  The rise in popularity of both groups is 
not tied to its religious rhetoric, which has been 
a constant, but the ability of the party to offer a 
coherent and appealing alternative to the 
political status quo.  Any retraction of the 
democratic platform, which is the basis of this 
alternative, would cost the Brotherhood dearly 
in public support.  The Muslim Brotherhood has 
had an Islamic identity since its creation, but it 
is only through the addition of peaceful and 
democratic activism in opposition to Mubarak 
that the group has emerged as the only viable 
opposition party to Mubarak.  Through 
participation in elections, the leadership of the 
party would have to confront this reality and 
realistically address its support or lose it. 
The moderate faction has its roots in the 
more populist (and popular) elements of the 
Brotherhood.  Many of the moderates started in 
student movements in the 1970s and became 
leaders of the professional syndicates (Phillips 
p. 14).   The syndicates have served as a source 
of the Brotherhood’s popularity because they 
serve as a means of distributing social services 
and demonstrate the administrative qualities of 
the Brotherhood that have made them 
exceptionally popular political candidates.  
Through its control of the medical syndicate, the 
Brotherhood is able to offer doctors better 
salaries than the government, run 22 hospitals, 
and have schools in every administrative district 
(Harrigan p. 104).  These social services have 
expanded the popularity of the Brotherhood 
tremendously (Harrigan p. 104).  The moderate 
factions of the Muslim Brotherhood are the 
group that has been the public face of the 
organization on the street and administrative 
backbone of the Brotherhood during its most 
recent rise to popularity starting toward the end 
of the 1980s.  This method of expanding 
electoral support has branched the Brotherhood 
out toward non-traditional sources of support 
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through non-religious means, much like the 
BJP. 
Demonstrating the electoral viability of 
the moderates is the electoral branch of the 
Brotherhood, in which the younger generation is 
extremely active (Mecham p. 103).  The leader 
of the electoral branch is a moderate who has 
openly voiced his desire for a separation of the 
party from the broader religious movement 
(Brown 2008 p. 8).  The success of this 
moderate branch in the 2005 elections 
demonstrates the support the moderates have 
from the Egyptian population.  The role of the 
Brotherhood as the most successful political 
opposition to Mubarak means that casting a vote 
for the Brotherhood is also a rejection of the 
current status quo.  Voting for a Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate does not automatically 
indicate support for the party elite.    Similar to 
the BJP, the Brotherhood has expanded into 
non-traditional sources of support, partially by 
presenting themselves as the only alternative to 
the status quo.  As the government continually 
deviates from its democratic rhetoric, the role of 
the Brotherhood as an opposition group 
becomes increasingly important.  Displeasure 
with the current government in Egypt creates a 
legitimate reason to vote for the Brotherhood.   
These similarities to the BJP suggest that 
the Brotherhood’s most recent return to 
popularity is dependent on their ability to voice 
an attractive alternative to Mubarak.  Their 
ability to do so thus far has kept the party intact, 
despite the emerging visibility of cleavages.  If 
legalized, electoral politics will force the 
Brotherhood to address internal cleavages and 
make meaningful concessions to its numerous 
moderate supporters or risk losing their support.  
The very democratic reforms advocated by the 
Brotherhood and the source of its recent surge in 
popularity will politically isolate them unless 
they embrace the reforms.  
Religious parties are not solely defined 
by their religious platforms.  While a religious 
identity may appeal to some as a source of 
political authority, these parties often offer 
social, economic and political platforms that can 
attract support for entirely non-religious 
reasons.  With the BJP and Muslim 
Brotherhood, respect for democratic institutions 
is a key element of both parties’ political 
policies.  In the case of the BJP, the already 
existing strength of Indian democratic 
institutions never made destruction of liberal 
institutions an option.  The rhetoric of the 
Muslim Brotherhood for the respect of, and 
desire to create, democratic institutions is both 
an encouraging sign and a key element to its 
popularity.  Political parties that do not practice 
a respect for democratic institutions will not 
consensually contribute to democratic 
governance in a positive manner, whether 
religious in nature or not, but to condemn a 
democratic party based on its belief in the role 
of religion is, in itself, an undemocratic practice. 
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